In PKC 2009, Gorantla, Boyd and González Nieto presented a nice result on modelling security for group key agreement (GKA) protocols. They proposed a novel security model (GBG model) that better supports the adversaries' queries than previous models for GKA protocols by considering KCI resilience. However, ephemeral key leakage attack resistance has been left outside the scope of the GBG model. In this paper, we demonstrate an ephemeral key leakage on an existing GKA protocol which has been shown secure in the GBG model. We then extend the GBG model by allowing the adversary greater attack powers of leaking ephemeral keys in GKA protocol session. We also apply the well known NAX-OS trick to propose an improvement to an existing GKA protocol, which can resist the ephemeral key leakage attack. The security of the improved protocol has been argued under the our new model.
INTRODUCTION
Recent rapid developments in networking and related mass communication media and digital technology have opened extensive possibilities for group applications. Group applications represent a special case of multi-party applications where the participants have some unifying relationship concerning their rights, responsibility and application goals [16] . Some well known group applications are digital conferences, text-based group communication, file and data sharing etc. Similar to other applications, security is a major concern in these applications where group members would like to prevent outsiders from obtaining sensitive communication content. The detailed information on the security issues for group applications can be found in [16] .
Group key establishment is a cryptographic protocol that enables a set of users to establish a common secret session key by communicating over a public channel. This session key can be applied for subsequent cryptographic usage. Group key establishment can be divided in two different classes: group key distribution (GKD) and group key agreement (GKA). In GKD protocols, a trusted party (either a third party or a group member) called group manager distributes the session key securely to the members of the group. In contrast, a GKA protocol allows all the participants to establish the session key where no party is needed to be chosen as the key generator and/or distributor and no secure channel is required. In this paper, we restrict our research to GKA protocols.
Although there are many security models [3, 12, 15, 1, 18, 19, 4] for two or three-party key agreement protocols, the formal model proposed by Bresson, Chevassut, Pointcheval and Quisquater [10] , which we refer to as the BCPQ model, is the first security model for GKA protocols. Following the work of Bresson, Chevassut and Pointcheval [8] (BCP model) that extended the BCPQ model to the dynamic membership case, they [9] revised the BCP model to meet the internal state information reveal resistance (BCP+) model. However, these models do not consider any malicious behaviour by the participants themselves. In CCS 2005, Katz and Shin [14] proposed a security model for GKA protocol, which provides the first formal treatment of security of G-KA in the presence of malicious participants (or insiders). Bohli, González-Vasco and Steinwandt [5] (BGS model) and Bresson and Manulis [11] (BM model) later proposed two extensions of the KS model under different corruption models. Additionally, the BGS and BM models deal with the issue of contributiveness in the presence of insiders.
All the models above provide definitions that consider the requirements on indistinguishability of computed group keys and forward secrecy. However, as discussed by Gorantla et al. [13] the above security notions do not consider key com-promise impersonation (KCI) resilience. To demonstrate the importance of considering resistance to KCI attacks for G-KA protocols, they presented KCI attacks on GKA protocols in different settings [6, 2, 7] . Gorantla et al. then proposed a new model (GBG model) by taking KCI resilience into account and also showed that the protocol of Bohli et al. [5] (BGS protocol) to be secure in the GBG model.
Inspired by Manulis et al.'s recent work [17] where the authors pointed out that the GKA security models have so far not considered leakage of ephemeral keys, we augment the GBG model by considering ephemeral key leakage. In our new model, we allow the adversary to reveal any long-term key and ephemeral key of participants involved except for both long-term key and ephemeral key of one of the participants of the test session. We then improve the BGS protocol and show that it is secure in the new model. More specially, we have the following results:
1. A stronger security model for GKA protocols. We propose a new model for GKA protocols which provides the adversary more attack capabilities than those in earlier models.
An attack on the BGS protocol and its improvement.
We first show that the BGS protocol is not secure in the proposed security model. To avoid this drawback, a solution where the ephemeral secret result will be generated by the hash function of the long-term key and the ephemeral key is put forward. This technique is known as the NAXOS trick in the literature [15] .
3.
A straightforward security proof in the new model. Under some well-studied assumptions, we prove that the improved BGS protocol is secure in our new model.
We begin with a brief review of the GBG model and discuss the attack not covered by their model in Section 2. We also give a simple ephemeral key leakage attack on the BGS protocol in the same section. Section 3 introduces our extended GBG model. In Section 4, we present an improved version of the BGS protocol which can resist the ephemeral key leakage attack. The formal security argument about the improved BGS protocol is given in Section 5.
THE GBG MODEL AND THE BGS PRO-TOCOL
In this section, we give an overview the GBG model and point out that the ephemeral key leakage attack is not covered by it. Then we present this attack on the BGS protocol which has been proven secure in the GBG model.
Overview of GBG model
The GBG model [13] provides a formal security assurance to GKA protocols. We give a high-level overview of the GBG model in this subsection.
Participants. A GKA protocol runs in a network of multiple interconnected participants where each participant is activated to run multiple sessions with its peers. As a result, participants in each such successful session establish a key called a session key. We denote the participant set by U = {U1, U2, · · · , Un} and the protocol may be run among any subset of these parties. In a GKA protocol, each participant may execute a polynomial number of protocol instances in parallel. We refer to the i-th instance of protocol run at U ∈ U as ∏ i U . Adversary model. The communication network is assumed to be fully controlled by an adversary M , that is, it may eavesdrop, delay, alter and insert messages during the run of the protocol at will. We define the security of a GKA protocol by a game between a challenger and the adversary M (an outsider adversary or a malicious insider) in which the adversary must solve a challenge given by the challenger to be considered successful. In this games, M is allowed to ask the following queries in any sequence.
Execute(
∏ i U ). This query returns the protocol messages that were exchanged during the honest execution ∏ i U of the protocol. This query models the passive attacks.
Send(
The adversary makes this query to obtain the message that the instance ∏ i U would generate on receipt of the message m. If m is an empty message the i-th instance of the protcol will be initiated at U .
RevealKey(
∏ i U ). This query returns the session key established at the accepted instance ∏ i U . Corrup(U ). The adversary makes this query to obtain the long-term key of the participant U .
RevealState(
The query returns the internal state of ( ∏ i U ). We assume that the internal state is erased once ∏ i U has accepted. Hence, a RevealState query to an accepted instance returns nothing.
Test(
∏ i U ). Only one query of this type is allowed to be asked by the adversary on an accepted instance ∏ i U at any time. To respond to this query, a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} is secretly chosen. If b = 1, then the real session key established at ( ∏ i U ) is returned. Otherwise, a uniformly chosen random value from the session key distribution is returned.
We now define the AKE security, the MA security and the Contributiveness based on the definitions of partner and freshness.
Definition 1 (Partner). Informally, an instance
∏ i U is said to be accepted if it goes into an accept state after receiving the last expected protocol message, that is, when an instance accepts, it holds a session key, a unique session identifier sid and a partner identifier pid. We assume that sid for each session is generated during the run of the protocol. The pid of an instance ∏ i U is a set of identities of the parties with whom ∏ i U wants to establish a session. It also includes the identity of U itself. The information of whether an instance has terminated with acceptance or not is assumed to be known to the adversary. Two instances ∏ i U and ∏ j U ′ at two different parties U and U ′ respectively are considered partnered iff 1. Both the instances have accepted.
The session identifiers of
∏ i U and ∏ j U ′ are the same.
3. The partner identifiers of ∏ i U and
Definition 2 (Freshness). An instance ∏ i U is fresh if the following conditions hold:
1. The instance ∏ i U or any its partner has not been asked a RevealKey query after their acceptance.
The instance
∏ i U or any its partner has not been asked a RevealState query before their acceptance.
If
∏ j U ′ is a partner of that is uncorrupted at the time ∏ i U accepts such that 1. There is no instance
There is an instance
We define the probability of MMA in winning the MA security game as AdvM M A . A protocol is said to provide mutual authentication in the presence of insiders if AdvM M A is negligible in k.
Definition 5 (Contributiveness [11] ). An adversary MCon against the contributiveness notion is allowed to make all the queries defined above. It operates in two stages prepare and attack as follows:
prepare MCon queries the instance ∏ and outputs some state information ζ along with a keyk.
At the end of prepare stage, a set ∑ is built such that ∑ consist of uncorrupted instances which have been asked wither Execute and Send queries.
attack On input (ζ, ∑ ), MCon interacts with the instances of ∏ as in the prepare stage.
At the end of this stage MCon outputs (U, i) and wins the games if an instance ∏ i U at an uncorrupted party U has terminated acceptingk with
We define the advantage of MCon, denoted by AdvM Con , as the success probability of MCon in winning the above game. A protocol is said to provide contributiveness in the presence of insiders if AdvM Con is negligible in k.
An attack not covered by the GBG model
We focus on Condition 2 in the definition of "Freshness" (Definition 2) and point out an attack which may compromise the security of GKA protocols proven secure in the GBG model. According to this condition, the GBG model does not allow the adversary to make RevealState query against the test session which it wants to attack. In other words, the GBG model does not provide any security guarantees for a session if the ephemeral key of a party has been leaked. To avoid such ephemeral key leakage (EKL) attack GBG model assumes that the internal state should be erased after ∏ i U has accepted. However, this restriction prevents the adversary from revealing the ephemeral keys of participants during the protocol execution process, that is, the GBG model restricts the adversary's ability to attack the objective GKA protocol using the revealed ephemeral key during the protocol execution process. Next, we will present a concrete EKL attack on the BGS protocol which has been shown secure in the GBG model.
EKL attack on BGS protocol
The BGS protocol [5] proposed by Bohli et al. has been shown to satisfy their definitions of outsider and insider security. We briefly review the protocol here. 
Key Computation Each Ui computes the session key sk = H(pid∥k1∥ · · · ∥kn).

Algorithm 1: BGS protocol
Let U = {U1, U2, · · · , Un} be the set of the parties who want to establish the session key. Suppose that the group members are ordered in a logical ring with Ui−1 and Ui+1 being the left and right neighbors of Ui for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, U0 = Un and Un+1 = U1. During the initialization phase, a cyclic group G of prime order q, an arbitrary generator g of G and the description of a hash function H that maps to {0, 1} k are chosen. Each party is assumed to have a longterm key pair for public signature. Algorithm 1 shows the execution process after initialization phase.
We show that BGS protocol is vulnerable to the EK-L attack. Without loss of generality, we assume that the ephemeral key of Ui is leaked, an adversary M can compute t One might think that a straightforward solution would be to delete xi of participant Ui during the protocol execution process. However, it is infeasible. In more specific terms, it is impossible for Ui to delete xi after Round 1, since Ui has to use xi in Round 2 to compute t L i and t R i . Note: It is worth mentioning that BGS protocol is secure in the GBG model since according to the GBG model, all the ephemeral xis will be erased after the corresponding session completed. Here we would like to reiterate that the attack not covered in the GBG model.
EXTENDED GBG MODEL
We now present our extended GBG (eGBG) model. Participants. A GKA protocol runs in a network of multiple interconnected participants where each participant is activated to run sessions for itself and its peers. As a result, participants in such a session establish a session key. We denote the participant set by U = {U1, U2, · · · , Un} and the protocol may be run among any subset of these parties. In a GKA protocol, each participant may execute a polynomial number of protocol instances in parallel. We refer to the i-th protocol instance at U ∈ U as ∏ i U . Adversary model. The communication network is assumed to be fully controlled by an adversary M , that is, it may eavesdrop, delay, alter and insert messages during the process of the protocol at will. We define the security of a GKA protocol through a game between a challenger and the adversary M (an outsider adversary or a malicious insider) in which the adversary must solve a challenge to be considered successful. In this games, M is allowed to select the identities of all honest participants and issue the following queries in any sequence.
Execute(
∏ i U ). It returns the messages that were exchanged during the honest execution ∏ i U of the protocol. This query models the passive attacks.
Send(
∏ i U , m). It returns the message that the instance ∏ i U would generate on receipt of the message m. If the m is empty message, then i-th instance of the protocol will be initiated at U .
RevealKey(
∏ i U ). The adversary makes this query to obtain the session key established at the accepted ∏ i U .
Long-termKeyReveal(U ). The adversary makes this query
to obtain the long-term key of the participant U .
EphemeralKeyReveal(
The adversary makes this query to obtain the ephemeral key of U in the i-th run.
Test(
∏ i U ). The adversary is allowed to issue only one query of this form on an accepted session ∏ i U . To respond to this query, a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} is selected. If b = 1, then the real session key is returned. Otherwise, a random value uniformly chosen from the session key distribution is returned.
We now define the notion of freshness according to the same definition of partnership in the GBG model.
Definition 6 (Freshness). An instance
∏ i U is fresh if the following conditions hold:
The instance
∏ i U or any its partner has not been asked a Long-termKeyReveal query and a EphemeralKeyReveal query simultaneously before their acceptance.
If
∏ j U ′ is a partner of
The description of the AKE security, MA security and Contributiveness are the same as that in the GBG model in Section 2.1. Compared to the GBG model, we 1. Replace the RevealState query with the EphemeralKeyReveal by which the adversary can get the ephemeral key of the instance ∏ i U . At the same time, we remove the limitation of the original GBG model where once ( ∏ i U ) has accepted the internal state is erased.
2. Replace the Corrupt query with the Long-termKeyRe veal to give the adversary the power to reveal the longterm keys.
3. Modify the Condition 2 in the notion of "freshness" to expand the attack scope of the adversary. That is, the adversary is allowed to reveal any subset of four pieces of secret information (the long-term keys and the ephemeral keys of the participant and its partner) which does not contain both the long-term and ephemeral keys of one party.
Remark : In many security models, when the adversary corrupts an honest party, it takes full control over this party and reveals all its secret information. In the GBG model, since the Corrupt query just simulates the long-term key leakage attack, we change the tag of this query to capture the adversarial ability more accurately. The role of Long-termKeyReveal in our model is the same as that of Corrupt in the GBG model. Overall, eGBG model extends the adversarial capabilities to the following extent: we allow the adversary to reveal any subset of the long-term keys and ephemeral keys of ∏ i U and its partner which does not contain both the long-term and ephemeral keys of one party.
BGS+ PROTOCOL
To construct a GKA protocol which is secure in eGBG model, we modify some details of the original BGS protocol and get BGS+ protocol.
Description of BGS+ protocol
We first introduce some notations that will be used in the rest of the paper.
The set of the parties who want to establish the session key. We also suppose that the group members are ordered in a logical ring. This benefit of doing so is obvious: since we will destroy xi after getting the needed values, this method avoid the possibility that the ephemeral secret state will be obtained by the adversary during the protocol execution process. On the other hand, even if the adversary gets the ephemeral key xi, it can not obtain the xi yet since it has to get the longterm key ski at the same time, but it is not allowed to reveal the long-term key and the ephemeral key simultaneously in eGBG model.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Now, we prove that BGS+ protocol achieves the AKE security goal, the MA security goal and the Contributiveness.
Theorem 1 (AKE security). Let H1, H2 and H be three hash functions modelled as random oracles and the signature scheme used in GBS+ is UF-CMA secure, MAKE be an adversary against the AKE-security of the protocol. 2 λ − 1|, where qH 2 and qH are the maximum number of times of hash queries H2 and H; qs represents the maximum number of queries to the Send oracles asked by the adversary.
The proofs for Theorems 1, 2 and 3 can be found in the full version [20] .
CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the GBG model and found out that this model doesn't consider the ephemeral key leakage resistance property. Considering this drawback, we extend GBG model to the following extent: the only corruption powers we don't give an adversary in the game are that it is not allowed to reveal both the long-term key and the ephemeral key of a legitimate party simultaneously. We then introduce a new GKA protocol called BGS+ protocol based on BGS protocol which is provably secure in GBG model but cannot resist ephemeral key leakage attack and prove that it is secure in the new model. As far as we know, this is the first provably secure GKA protocol in this strong security model.
As for limitations, we didn't take the efficiency into account. A natural direction for further research is the design of provably secure protocols with lower computational cost and communication cost. Additionally, the design of GKA protocols in standard models where the security of the protocols isn't dependent on the security of random oracles is another imperative future research consideration.
